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STRATEGY AND CAMPAIGN PLAN FOR DEFEATING SERBIAN AGGRESSION
Sun Tzu said:
Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy; Next best is to disrupt his alliances; the next best is to attack his army. The worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when there is no alternative. The purpose of this paper is to develop a national strategy and theater campaign for defeating Serbian aggression in the former Yugoslavia. It builds upon the assessment that Bosnian Serb attacks have their source in Serbian policy and support. If the alliance between Bosnian Serbs and Serbia is broken, and if Serbian will to fight can be broken, victory can be attained at a relatively low cost. Any ground combat that will be required to defeat remaining Bosnian Serb forces can be undertaken by the Bosnians themselves once the arms embargo is lifted and U.S. and other nations begin supplying them with the wherewithal to defend themselves.
Pofitical Guidance
The following televised speech was given by the President at the National War
College on April 28, 1994:
The United States cannot permit raw unjustified aggression by Serbia and its minions to continue. The violations of international law prohibiting genocide in the case of non-Serbian citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina also cannot be permitted to continue: To permit these actions to continue without resolute action by the United States and NATO would send a clear message to other potential aggressors around the world that armed unprovoked aggression against their neighbors will be tolerated. The Serbian policy being carded out by Serbian leader Milosevic of attempting to unite all Serbians under one state, and ensuring through a policy of "ethnic cleansing" that Serbian nationals are the majority population in a new Greater Serbia, must be defeated. The Bosnian Serbs are misguided in their attempts to support and further this policy. The United States believes that the arms embargo should be maintained against Serbia, but should be lifted immediately in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbia should also understand that the international community opposes any "ethnic cleansing" policies that might be undertaken elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, including Kosovo and Macedonia. Prison camps must also be closed and their prisoners freed.
The United States believes that the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina should be returned to their pre-war status, and that all Serbian and Bosnian Serb tanks and heavy artillery should be immediately withdrawn beyond these borders. Any such equipment and forces that remains within Bosnia and Herzegovina one month from now will be subject to allied air attack. Should a withdrawal not be underway within the week, the United States will assume that no such withdrawal is planned and act accordingly. Should additional harm be threatened or inflicted on the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the United States will also be forced to act. The United States will begin working immediately with the Muslim, Croatian, and Bosnian leadership to ensure that they understand our humanitarian and democratic objectives for the region.
As President, I must always consider the risk of the loss of American lives that any military action entails and carefully weigh any such costs against the potential gains, and the risk of inaction. Certainly, we will undertake our actions in a manner designed to attain victory at the lowest possible cost. But again, the risk of loss of life is there. The American people have a right to know what these lives are being risked for. The answer is both abstract and obvious.
Some have called what is going on in Bosnia and Herzegovina a "civil war." They are incorrect. This is a war planned, prosecuted, and supplied by Serbia. It is a grab for territory and resources. It is an attempt by a relatively small number of civilians aided and supported by the Serbian military --aided and led by Milosevic, to take advantage of and exacerbate fear of one strong minority against a weaker one. Just as Hitler convinced good people in Germany that the Jews were their enemy, Milosevic has convinced Serbian people and many Bosnian Serbs that "ethnic cleansing" rather than shared power and representative government are in their interests.
After World War II, the United States said of the Nazi Genocide "Never Again." The Serbian policy of "ethnic cleansing" is genocide. If the United States stands for anything, believes in anything, and is a world leader, it must be that our power will be used not just to defend our own lives, but the lives of innocent men, women, and children, whose only crime is that they are a minority religion and that someone wants control of their land. In Nazi Germany, Jewish possessions and property were quickly confiscated. The same policy is underway in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbian leader Milosevic has sponsored a policy advocating the creation of a "Greater Serbia." In this Great Serbian policy, all Serbs have the right to live in one country. Rather than be represented as a political minority in Bosnia or Croatia, they have been persuaded by the Serbian nationalists to undertake military and genocidal action to ensure that they are the majority. In order to accomplish this, other ethnic and religious groups must be eliminated from the territory desired by the Serbs --the result is the horror that has become reality in Bosnia and Herzegovina these past three years.
When I assess the risk of inaction, I conclude that to stand by and watch the horror continue, or to seek the Bosnian state chewed up and its people "cleansed" out of existence, I fear for what our inaction would make the United States. First, those currently deterred from hostilities will no longer be deterred. Second, the United States would be akin to people who watched out their window while a woman was raped in front of them. If that is who we become, we will not be the United States that we want our children to read about in the history books.
Some of our NATO allies may be willing to support our policies. Some may not. The EC, however, has not succeeded in addressing the problem. We must. We must because the United States cannot permit there to be established in the post Cold War World a model of action based on Serbian aggression. We have been called a "reluctant superpower." So we are. But the consequences of permitting raw aggression to be used to acquire territory and the consequences of continued inaction in the face of genocide must call this reluctant superpower to resolute action.
But again, what of the costs? Serbian and Bosnian Serb aggression has continued when faced with weak, unarmed, and helpless victims. In the face of the credible threat of force, backed up as needed to support the credibility of the threat, the Serbs and the Bosnian Serbs have backed off. We can hope that they will take our threat of an air campaign seriously and withdraw beyond Bosnia and Herzegovina's borders. If not, we will make it more difficult for the Bosnian Serbs to operate and will raise the cost of aggression to Serbia. We hold no animosity against the people of Serbia who may themselves be opposed to their leadership's policy and to the Serbian war of terror. We do not support a Bosnian war of retaliation against Serbia or Bosnian Serbs. What we seek in the former Yugoslavia is peace, democracy, and an opportunity for all the people of the region to heal and enjoy their freedom from the terror of ethnic cleansing.
I thereby direct that U.S. policy is that the continuation of the arms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina is contrary to the UN Charter's proscribed right to self defense. The United States will therefore seek its revision to apply it only to Serbia; it this cannot be accomplished expeditiously, the United States will not continue to recognize its validity. The United States will carefully observe Serbian and Bosnian Serb action to determine if they are withdrawing their forces back into Serbia. If they are not, the United States will, in coordination with our NATO allies when possible, and in every case with the duly appointed representative governments in Croatia and BosniaJHerzogovina, attack these and other Serb and Bosnian Serb military targets. We will continue to seek a peaceful solution, but this solution will not reward aggression.
Thank You.
Strategic Military Objectives
The strategic military objectives deriving from the President's speech are as follows:
1)
2)
Prepare to interdict Serbian lines of communication and support.
Prepare to attack Serbian heavy artillery and tanks, beginning with those causing the largest civilian casualties.
3) Achieve air superiority and eliminate all known anti-aircraft capability.
4) Assist Bosnian forces in training in use of ground equipment.
5) Prepare to evacuate to safe location all UN, NATO, and civilian observers. withdrawal of all Serbian and Bosnian Serb tanks and heavy artillery beyond these borders; 3) closure of Serb prison camps and release of prisoners.
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Enemy Forces
Ciausewitz was specific regarding the knowledge of the enemy required including the critical factor of the enemy's will:
If you want to overcome your enemy you must match your effort against his power of resistance, which can be expressed as the product of two inseparable factors, viz. the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will. The extent of the means at his disposal is a matter -through not exclusively There is a great shortage of junior officers and NCOs. The morale and discipline of the troops is very low. This is even true for the Serbian and Montenegrin reservists, despite the fact that they are well-paid; their salary is reportedly three times what an average worker earns. The units withdrawn from Slovenia and Croatia were poorly structured and largely unsuitable for combat employment in their new deployment areas. A similar situation prevails even in the units sent as reinforcements to the former 2nd MD from other parts of the country. The only troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina which have any combat effectiveness are heavy and rocket artillery, and the military police. (Vego, Oct 92: 447) The author of ~the above statement concluded his assessment of Serbian forces by saying that the former federal troops are poorly organized, trained and led. He notes that their successes have been almost entirely due to their overwhelming superiority in firepower, but also highlights that "whenever they have met a well-armed and motivated opponent they have suffered defeat or severe setback." (Vego, Oct 92: 448) States, and that the United States would be crippled by the specter of Viet Nam.
Their fear was that Yugoslavia and Serbia would be addressed in the same manner as Iraq.
The Serbian strategy for ensuring that it did not have to encounter Western, and particularly U.S. forces was a deception strategy focused on portraying itself as not directly involved in a war against Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It thus has undertaken a number of deception efforts primarily in the international public affairs arena. It has also sought to improve domestic support for its war by asserting that
Serbs in the other former Yugoslavian republics were or were going to be the victims of genocide and in highlighting territorial gains achieved at low cost.
The primary weakness of Serbian strategy is that it relies on the inaction of Western nations and on its overwhelming military power todefeat its enemies at a low cost in Serbian lives.
Probable major enemy strategic and operational objectives: Strategically, the Serb forces will seek to undermine the will of the United States to act by conducting a public affairs effort. This effort will seek to portray Bosnian Serb forces as a legitimate combatant in a civil war and to attempt to portray U.S. actions as causing civilian casualties. Operationally, the Serbs can be expected to seek to maximize and hold ground, and to continue "cleansing" the local population to try to assert that turning the held territory back over to the Bosnian Government would jeopardize the rights of the majority population in those areas. 
Enemy operational and sustainment capabilities:
Direct Attack of Enemy Strategic Centers of Gravity:
The strategic and operational centers of gravity identified above will be attacked using U.S. airpower.
Resupply of enemy forces will be interdicted. The withdrawal of enemy forces from the territory will not be halted so long as it is expeditious.
Tasks 1) Observe movement of military equipment to determine if and when it will be removed beyond the Drina river.
2) Provide necessary military equipment to the Bosnian Government under an agreement that they will provide for humanitarian and democratic rights for Bosnian Serbs and will not use the equipment to invade Serbia. Since the question of war trials will arise, begin working with civilian agencies to provide for war crimes tribunals after the war. .'7"3. * ,,
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